Research
I am interested in the aspects of the mind that relate to normativity. This results in my enthusiasm for the sciences of the mind, philosophy of mind, and certain topics in ethics. I am also excited about offering my own answers to questions such as how to live a good life as a philosopher.
I am often drawn to paradoxes and puzzles. I am an aspiring phenomenologist (i.e., I like to reflect on my own experiences and theorize about them).
See below for my research projects.
Representationalism
and aspect shifts
Representationalism is (roughly) the idea that the phenomenal properties of experiences are explained by their representational properties – that is, what it is like to undergo an experience is explained by what the experience is about. It has been argued that the phenomenon of aspect shift poses a challenge to representationalism.
In this project, I focus on one particular aspect shift and address the following two questions:
(a) Does the aspect shift in question pose a challenge to represesentationalism?
(b) If so, what claim does it challenge? Relatedly, what counts as a satisfactory response from representationalism?
Mental illness and Self-blame
It is very normal for those who are suffering from mental illness (e.g. depression) to blame themselves for the fact that they are suffering from mental illness. For example, those who suffer from situational depression (i.e., depression following a traumatic event in one's life) might blame themselves for their illness, because they believe that had they been mentally stronger, they would be able to overcome the depression. Recognition of one's failure to fulfill one's duty towards others (e.g. being a loving father and a supportive family member) due to one's mental illness can also lead to this type of self-blame.
I hope to explore the following question in this project: under what conditions is it appropriate to blame oneself for one's mental illness? Orthodox theories approach this question by considering three factors: (a) the person being blamed; (b) the blamer; (c) the blaming interaction. The propriety conditions of self-blame in the context of mental illness raise interesting questions to all three factors.
The Causal Structure of Depression
A common assumption about depression is Essentialism, according to which the essence of depression is a pathological state that causes its symptoms. In this project, I aim to challenge Essentialism by showing that endorsing it along with independently attractive claims about causation results in an explanatory dilemma regarding the current treatment status of depression.
The efficacy of psychotherapy and medication in treating depression lends support to two hypotheses about the essence of depression. The mental hypothesis holds that the essence of depression is problematic thinking patterns, while the neurobiological hypothesis holds that it is chemical imbalances in the brain. Essentialism entails that only one hypothesis is true. If the mental hypothesis is true, then the efficacy of medication in treating depression is hard to explain. If the neurobiological hypothesis is true, then the efficacy of psychotherapy in treating depression is hard to explain. I suggest that we can escape the explanatory dilemma by conceiving the essence of depression as a network of symptoms that causally reinforce each other.
Transformative Experience and Authenticity
Transformative experiences are those that teach us new things that we could not have known prior to undergoing them, while simultaneously changing our core preferences. Famously, L.A. Paul argued that transformative experiences pose a problem for rational authenticity. This has generated considerable anxiety and prompted various proposed solutions, all seeking to demonstrate that transformative experiences do not, in the end, undermine rational authenticity. A less explored path is to critically examine the ideal of rational authenticity itself. This is the task I undertake in this project.
I argue that such an ideal rests on a debatable conception of self-knowledge and the self, according to which our core preferences are typically accessible through reflection or deliberation, and are changed by personally transformative experiences. I suggest that we often discover our preferences by living through the relevant experiences. Relatedly, many experiences commonly described as personal transformations are better seen as discoveries: they do not transform the self but provide deeper insights into it. I conclude by proposing a different conception of authenticity, which is achieved after transformative choices rather than in the making of them.
Email me for drafts!
Other Interests
Philosophy of Mind
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Consciousness
its relation to attention, overflow, global workspace theory
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Intentionality
what is it??
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Cognitive Phenomenology
whether introspection can provide any evidence for the existence of cognitive phenomenology
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Mental Content
naturalistic theories, action-first approach
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Perception, (Episode) Memory & Imagination
the connection and difference between them
Moral Psychology
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Blame and Forgiveness
when it is morally permissible to blame, when it is morally good to forgive
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Emotion
theories of emotions, recalcitrant emotions, higher-order emotions, the relation between negative emotions and a good life
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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Mental Architecture
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Explanation in Cognitive Science
whether cognitive science provides any explanation of human mind and behavior; if so, what is its relation to other types of explanation (e.g. folk psychology)
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Perception and Cognition
what is the border between them, if there is any
History of Philosophy
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(Later) Wittgenstein
private language, rule-following
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Hume
sentimentalist theories of value; Humean theories of the passions
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Nietzsche
genealogy of morality
Additionally, you can find my tennis-related research proposals here.
